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Abstract
This paper argues that in order to win the long-term fight against Islamic Jihadist movements, we must confront 
their ideological foundations and provide the majority of Muslims with an alternative narrative that satisfies 
their social identity needs for a positive esteem. By analysing social identity dynamics of Western-Muslim 
interactions, this paper presents some novel ideas that can lead to the creation of such a narrative.
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Introduction
Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, violent extremism originating from the Islamic world has been a concern for Western policy makers. Although their primary interest has been to prevent immediate attacks against the West and its allies, understanding the root causes of Islamic extremism 
and countering the ideological infrastructure of Jihad have become increasingly important to Western 
decision makers and researchers. Recent terrorist attacks by ISIS sympathizers in Canada, the US, the UK, 
Australia, and France have demonstrated the limits of a narrowly-focussed prevention strategy. Formulating 
an effective, broad counter-offensive that can compete against the Jihadi narrative in the war of ideas and 
strengthen the forces of moderate Islam has remained a challenge because of the lack of a credible alternative 
narrative. This article carries out a social identity theoretic analysis of Western-Islamic interactions to 
better understand these challenges and suggests some promising ideas for the development of an alternative 
narrative.
History
Islamic nations and the West have a millennia-long history of intellectual conflict and violent warfare. 
Crusades and colonialism are just two particularly well known milestones along this road littered with such 
monuments. The Muslim-Christian dialogue of conflict began within a few years after the birth of Islam—the 
‘newer’ religion. In 636 CE, just a short fourteen years after Prophet Muhammad’s death, Judeo-Christian 
Jerusalem succumbed to Islam’s expanding influence. Within the short span of a few years all the major 
Christian centres of the Middle East (including Antioch, Damascus, Alexandria, and Carthage) had come 
under Islamic rule. There were repeated Muslim attacks against the headquarters of the Eastern Christian 
Church–Constantinople (which finally capitulated in 1453). Pope Gregory declared the first Crusade as a 
counter offensive against Muslims in 996. For the next three hundred years, the two civilizations militarily 
fought against each other in a broad front extending from Spain in the west to Syria in the east. As a result 
of the 500 year-long expansion of Islam and the resulting meteoric rise in Muslim fortunes, the Islamic myth 
of invincibility became widespread—especially among Muslims. “If you faithfully follow Allah and his path, 
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Allah will make you victorious” became a firmly embedded as a part of Muslim identity (Akyol 2011).
The fatal blow against the Muslim expansion came from an unexpected quarter. The Mongol invasions of the 
thirteenth century were so ferocious that they broke through the Islamic narrative of invincibility. This was 
the first time the Muslims were forced to ask the question of what went wrong (Lewis 2003). What reduced 
this cognitive dissonance (Festinger and Schachter 1964) for most Muslims was not a revision of the belief in 
God’s promise of victory. Instead, as the 13th century cleric Ibn-e-Tamiyya explained, Allah had taken victory 
away from Muslims because they had stopped following Islam faithfully enough. The only way to restore 
the glory of the golden era of Islam was to go back to faithfully following Islamic tenets, in particular Jihad, 
argued Ibn-e-Tamiyya and others.
While the Mongol rulers themselves eventually converted to Islam, and the Ottoman Empire had some 
success in reuniting Muslims under one empire and making further inroads into Eastern Europe, Islamic 
communities never regained the degree of cultural and material dominance over the Christian West that 
they enjoyed in the 11th and 12th centuries. The myriad reasons for this include the rise of science, reason, 
and free thinking in Europe and its relative decline in the Islamic countries. The final insult from a Muslim 
perspective came with the military defeat of the Ottoman Empire, the disbanding of the Caliphate, and the 
colonial occupation of Muslim countries throughout Middle East, North Africa, and South and East Asia in 
the 19th and early 20th centuries. Faced with this degradation, Muslims once again turned inward and asked 
themselves “what went wrong.” And once again, by far the most dominant answer provided was to echo Ibn-
e-Tamiyya’s 13th century observation. “Because we stopped following Islam faithfully enough” was the answer 
by the South Asian scholar Abul-ala-Moudoodi and by Egyptians Syed Qutb and Hasan Al-Banna (Akyol 
2011). A recent survey reveals that there is a widely-held opinion by Muslims around the world that they 
should adhere to the tenets of Islam more closely (PewForum 2012).
A legacy of this long history of mutual adversity is that Western countries are seen as hostile to Islam 
by Muslims around the world (Figure 1). When asked to identify the greatest danger to their nation, 
Indonesians, Pakistanis, and Malaysians chose United States as the biggest danger to their survival 
(PewForum 2012). A separate 2014 Pew Global Survey found that while, “…a global median of 65% voice an 
affirmative opinion about America...This includes a median of 74% in Africa, 66% in Western Europe, 66% 
in Asia, 65% in Latin America, but just 30% in the Middle East” (PewGlobalSurvey 2014). The lowest ratings 
for the US were found in the Islamic world. Table 1 shows the US favourability ratings for Islamic countries 
surveyed by Pew.
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Figure 1: Median percentage of Muslims who perceive the Americans and Europeans as hostile to the Muslims 
according to a 2011 Pew Global Survey.
Andrew Kohut, directory of the Pew Research Center for People and the Press, argues that “the most serious 
problem facing the United States is its very poor public image in the Muslim world, especially in the Middle 
East/Conflict Area.” (el-Nawawy 2006) In order to positively change this image, the US government launched 
a series of multimillion dollar programmes designed to, “improve America’s image in the Middle East and 
win the hearts and minds of the Arab people.” (el-Nawawy 2006) This included launching of Radio Sawa 
and Alhurra Television to broadcast in Arabic. A study by el-Nawawy (2006) found that listening to the US-
sponsored networks not only failed to improve Arab perceptions of the US foreign policy, but actually had 
the opposite effect. People’s attitudes towards US foreign policy actually worsened since they started listening 
to Radio Sawa and watching Alhurra TV. The failure of such efforts may be due to an inability of the US 
programme architects to appreciate the challenges of influencing members of a target audience that considers 
the US to be an adversarial group seeking to corrupt their culture. 
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Table 1: Pew Global Attitudes Survey US Favourability Ratings in the Muslim Countries.
Social Psychology of Outgroup Influences
Social identity theory (SIT) is one of the most well developed social psychological models of group 
interactions including intergroup violence. (Tajfel and Turner 1985, Tajfel and Turner 1986) According to 
SIT, group members engage in violent collective action against an outgroup if they believe that doing so will 
enhance their group’s status and lower the outgroup’s status. In addition to violent collective action against 
an outgroup, groups also use seemingly non-violent strategies such as social creativity which allow them to 
reshape their shared beliefs so that the ingroup’s status looks better when compared to the outgroup. (Hogg 
and Vaughan 2002) One of the social creativity strategies is to reinterpret the dimensions of comparison 
between groups. Ingroup members can elevate the importance of positive ingroup characteristics and 
downgrade those dimensions on which an outgroup looks better (van Knippenberg 1978, Mummendey 
and Schreiber 1984). This can sometimes produce counterintuitive and unexpected results. For instance, 
in comparison with dominant white Americans, African- and Latino-American status looks lower when 
status is computed using the dimensions of wealth and educational achievements. Some social psychologists 
(e.g., (Powell 2011)) argue that black ghetto culture shifts dimensions of comparison to street toughness and 
physical prowess because these dimensions of comparison make Black Americans from the ghetto look better 
relative to White Americans.
Frustrated by a social order in which ascendancy was thwarted, marginalized primarily African- and 
Latino-American communities invented their own alternative system in which their ruggedly coun-
tercultural personas are privileged. Encoded in its narratives, apparel, embellishments, and actual 
physiology, the hip-hop subculture manifests rejection of the dominant culture’s systematized mores, 
norms, institutions, and legitimacy…. devalued traits such as misogyny, hypermasculinity, and chil-
dren out-of-wedlock are all imbued with in-group social value. (p. 462) (Powell 2011)
Social psychologists, such as (Taylor 2002), argue that such redefinitions are necessary to allow members of 
a stigmatized group to maintain a positive self-esteem which is needed for their mental well-being. Social 
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psychologists also contrast social creativity (largely viewing it as positive) with violent collective action 
against an outgroup (largely viewing it as negative). However, cultural scientists studying strategies used by 
minorities to cope with their marginalization have observed that social creativity strategies often work hand 
in glove with violent collective action. A study of the Black American social movements by Powell (2011) 
shows that social creativity strategies that result in development and propagation of myths of Black ghetto 
males as hypermasculine tough-guys who fearlessly confront an oppressive and unjust police can also result 
in an increase in collective violence against the police. Powell (2011) argues that an unchallenged glorification 
of perceived in-group strengths can result in intense expressions of outgroup hatred such as the 1992 Ice-T 
hit song “Cop Killer.”
A similar dynamic can be seen at work among Muslim social and religious movements. Many of these 
movements have their roots in the anti-colonial struggle by Muslim societies against their Western occupiers. 
During the colonial period, dominance of the West in material wealth and military technology became 
hard to deny even for the most chauvinist Muslims. Most of the creative Muslims thinkers including Sunni 
(Abul-ala-Moudoodi, Jalal-ul-Din Afghani, Syed Qutb, and Hasan Al-Banna), Shia (Imam Khomeini & 
Sheikh Hasan Nasrallah), and heterodox (such as Mirza Ghulam Ahmad) found Muslims receptive to their 
social identity redefinition attempts. They argued that spirituality and family values count for more than 
material wealth and individual freedom and that while the West has material wealth and individual freedom, 
Muslims have spiritual wealth and strong family bonds. (Funk and Said 2004) As a result of at least a century 
of persistent redefinition efforts by Muslims social identity entrepreneurs (Haslam, Reicher et al. 2005, Upal 
2005), in most of the Muslim world, Westerners are perceived to be irreligious and too focused on their 
pursuit of individual desires at the expense of their family’s needs. Thus a 2011 Pew Global survey found that 
when Muslims were asked about their perceptions of the Westerners, they listed selfish, violent, greedy, and 
immoral as their most common perceptions. (PewGlobalAttitudesProject 2011)
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Figure 2: In the US & Europe the figures are for Christians only while in remaining countries they are for 
Muslims only.
So-called ‘Good Muslims’, on the other hand, are perceived to be highly religious and family oriented. A 2001 
British Home Office Citizenship Survey found that for British Muslims, family is the most important factor 
followed by religion while for British Christians, religion ranked seventh. (Choudhury 2007) When asked by 
Pew whether they consider themselves Muslim or British first, 81% of British Muslims picked Muslim while 
only 7% picked British. (Choudhury 2007) A 2011 Pew Global Survey found that unlike Christians who 
consider themselves as French (90%), Germans (70%), Russians (68%), British (63%), Spanish (53%), and 
Americans (46%) first, most Muslims around the world consider themselves to be Muslims first (Figure 2). 
Thus instead of comparing themselves with the West on per-capita income or individual rights, they compare 
themselves with the West on the degree of devotion to their religion and culture and on the strength of their 
social ties with family and friends.
The United States has spent considerable resources in efforts to promote a more positive image in the Middle 
East through funding the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), Middle East Partnership Initiative 
(MEPI), and other programs (Sharp 2006). However, Middle Easterners appear to be less than impressed by 
US efforts. In fact the situation seems to be getting worse. The 2011 Pew Survey found that global Muslim 
perceptions of American and European hostility had actually increased since 2006, “with the percentage 
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describing Americans as hostile rising 11 percentage points in Turkey and Pakistan, six points in Egypt, and 
five in Jordan… The view that Europeans are hostile has become more common since 2006 in Turkey (+13 
percent), Jordan (+11 percent), Egypt (+7 percent), and Pakistan (+7 percent).” (PewGlobalAttitudesProject 
2011)
In order to arrest these negative developments, we need to better understand how creative myths 
painstakingly weaved by social identity entrepreneurs, are contributing to the growth of anti-Western 
Jihadism among Muslims around the world. Just as we saw earlier with the social creativity strategy that 
resulted in a redefinition of African- and Latino-American males, the intense focus on the dimension of 
religiosity among Muslims has resulted in being a devout Muslims as the only acceptable way to be a good 
person. It is in this atmosphere that Jihadists find easy recruits. Far from providing Muslims an alternative 
to religious extremism and violence, socially creative ideologies actually prepare the fertile ground where 
radicalisation and Jihadism can flourish.
While social creativity is often seen from the perspective of an underprivileged minority group as the group’s 
valiant struggle to construct a positive self-image (Galinsky, Hugenberg et al. 2003), it can also be seen 
from the perspective of the majority group as remoulding core social identity beliefs of a minority group. 
For example, by collectively stereotyping African-Americans as brutes and Jezebels, White Americans have 
been able to influence African-Americans to redefine their core social identity beliefs in what it means to be 
a good African-American (Powell 2011). This suggests that by understanding the social identity dynamics, 
a dominant group can affect core social identity beliefs of a marginalized group. This is contrary to the 
argument often offered as definitive conclusion by some social scientists that it is not possible for the West to 
positively affect core social identity beliefs of Muslims and that only other Muslims can engage in the battle 
of ideas against jihadists. It suggests that the West can actually play an active role in positively affecting the 
social identity beliefs of Muslims.
Why Does the Jihadi Message Resonate With Some Muslims
The jihadi message has been successful in motivating some Muslims to join a radical cause because it is a 
natural extension of the dominant narrative in the Islamic world. It follows the arcing pattern  (Figure 3) that 
many successful messages of social change possess. (Upal, Packer et al. 2011)  Arcing narratives acknowledge 
that a group is currently not doing well, remind the group of its glorious past, and promise that making a 
change to group’s shared beliefs will restore that glory in the future.  A series of studies have found that such 
narrative structure is more persuasive than other structures especially on those group members that identify 
strongly with the group and are especially resistant to most social change messages. (Upal, Packer et al. 2011)
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Figure 3: Arcing pattern of glorious-past‒inglorious-present‒glorious future that successfully overcomes a group’s 
natural resistance to messages of change.
The key tenets of the Islamist narrative created and propagated by creative Islamic thinkers are as follows.
1. The world was a terrible place before Islam especially for the vulnerable such as women and orphans.
2. The arrival of Islam ushered in a golden era of human rights, prosperity, and happiness for all. The 
first Muslims strictly adhered to the tenets of Islam and were therefore rewarded by Allah with victory 
after victory over non-Muslims. This era lasted till the end of fourth Islamic caliphate.
3. After the era of strict compliance, Muslims moved away from Islam. As they did, Allah started taking 
away his blessings. While there were several valiant attempts to slow down societal degradation (e.g., Umar 
II), they were largely unsuccessful and the decay continued unabated. The low-point of Islam occurred 
when crusading colonial powers occupied Muslim lands. Those powers now control Muslims through 
oppressive puppet regimes who make decisions that favour the West.
4. Those who support the West and its puppet regimes in Muslims countries are not Muslims but 
apostates. Apostates who actively plot against Muslims deserve to be punished with death.
5. The only way to regain the lost Glory of Islam and to ensure a fulfilment of God’s promise to Muslims 
of a final victory of Islam is to go back to strictly complying with tenets of Islam.
6. Consequently, the doctrine, institution, and culture of Jihad needs to be reconstituted to ensure a final 
victory of Islam.
As discussed earlier, the roots of the above narrative go back to the 13th century and, at this point, it is so 
deeply embedded that a broad spectrum of Muslims regardless of their sectarian, social class, or political 
backgrounds generally agree with most of the above propositions (PewForum 2012, Moaddel 2014). These 
include members of heterodox movements such as Ahmadiyya Muslim Jama’at (Upal 2005), who disagree 
with 4 and 6 but agree with all of the remaining propositions. Thus the Jihadist message which affirms the 
above propositions only adds the proposition that “our organization is best suited to lead to the final victory 
of Islam.” The Jihadi Proposition resonates with most Muslims around the world despite their regional 
differences. This is because the Jihadist message is minimally counterintuitive for most Muslims and thus 
best suited to attract the target audience’s attention and yet be sensible enough to be accepted by them (Upal 
2014). A series of studies by Upal and colleagues (Upal 2014) found that people better remember those ideas 
that violate a small number of their expectations as compared to either ideas that do not violate any of their 
expectations or ideas that violate a large number of their expectations.
Countering the Narrative of International Jihadi Movement
While an increasing number of scholars and decision makers alike are beginning to recognize the need to 
counter the narrative of international Jihadi movement, the efforts to date have not been informed by a deep 
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analysis of the social identity dynamics of Islamic societies. Most of our ad-hoc counter-narrative efforts 
on both social and traditional mass media focus on pointing out logical absurdities of Jihadist worldview 
(e.g., “so DAESH wants to build a future, well is beheading a future you want, or someone controlling details 
of your diet and dress?”) but do not offer a well thought out comprehensive alternative narrative that can 
provide answers to the various issues facing Muslims around the world. Some argue that the task of defining 
and propagating a counter-narrative is best left to Muslims moderates. However, far from challenging the 
dominant Islamic narrative, most Muslim moderates currently being supported by the West, actually affirm 
most tenets of the dominant Islamist narrative while offering small modifications to 4 and 6. The problem is 
that without challenging the beliefs that define what it means to be a good Muslim, suggestions by moderate 
Muslims that military Jihad is forbidden simply make them bad Muslims in the eyes of their fellow Muslims. 
Unfortunately, this loss of credibility means that such messages have little effect on its intended audience even 
though the messages themselves may sound great to the Western powers that fund or make them.
Another attraction of the Jihadist narrative is that it is comprehensive. It explains everything from the 
reason for the creation of the universe (“man was created to worship God”) to why Muslim nations are so 
subservient to the dominance of the West (“because we’ve stopped following Islam”) to what a good Muslim 
needs to do in the next five minutes (“worship God so that we can regain our past glory”). The moderate 
message, on the other hand, is limited to pointing out isolated passages from the Qur’an or Hadith that ask 
Muslims to be tolerant of others. Is it any wonder, then, that the moderates are so badly losing the war of 
ideas both among the Muslim youth in the West and among Muslims in Muslim countries? Washington Post 
Columnist Fareed Zakaria recently noted that, “no matter what the U.S. has done, Islamic radicalism has been 
on the rise for two decades.” (Zakaria 2015) A 2006 Environics Institute Poll found that 73% of Canadian 
Muslims said that Toronto 18 attacks, if carried out would not have been justified. However, those between 
the ages of 18 to 29 were significantly more likely than older respondents to say that such attacks would have 
been justified. (Environics-Research-Group 2006)
A roundtable of counter-terrorism experts jointly organized by Hedayah (the International Center of 
Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)) and the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism 
concluded that the Jihadist narrative is successful because it, “is easy to understand, adaptable, and has a 
strong emotional and religious appeal… Al-Qaeda’s narrative also provides a clear solution (violence against 
the “enemy” to achieve its aims) to a real or perceived problem, which is often lacking in current counter-
narratives.” (Hedayah 2014). Noticing the lack of a comprehensive alternative narrative, the experts argued 
that, “there is currently no sustainable or long-lasting effort to create and coordinate counter-narratives” 
and advocated the need to develop “attractive alternative narratives” to counter the Jihadist worldview. The 
problem is that as a result of efforts by Muslim revivalist movements (recounted above) Muslim identity has 
come to be defined in terms of one’s blind devotion to religious doctrine and respect for opinions of older 
extended family members. This means that any Muslim who advocates individual rights or tolerance of 
others automatically comes to be considered a ‘bad’ Muslim or, even worse, a Western puppet and a traitor.
A Effective Alternative Narrative of Islam
What is needed today is an alternative narrative that is as comprehensive as the dominant Islamic narrative.  
We need a counter-narrative effort that doesn’t just defensively challenge small fringe elements of the 
dominant Islamic narrative but also offers Muslims around the world an attractive alternative.  Our counter-
narrative must satisfy their social psychological needs for positive self-esteem by telling them how they are 
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better than others, yet undermine the need to violently confront those they consider their outgroups.  It 
satisfactorily answers the “what went wrong” question and offers Muslims a non-violent course of action 
that they can follow to overcome their lower socioeconomic and political status.  We also need strategies that 
allow the West to play an active role in hindering the growth of violent Jihadism.
While this is a challenging task, a focussed effort can succeed in developing such a narrative.  Over the 
last century there have been numerous social movements in various parts of the Islamic world that have 
successfully challenged the traditional Islamic narrative.  For varying periods of time such movements 
succeeded in making their narrative as the dominant view in their part of the world.  This includes, for 
instance, the socialist movements in various Arab and non-Arab countries.  The socialist movements sought 
to use social creativity by arguing that the reason for Muslim decline was to be found in Western Capitalist 
oppression of the poor (Ismael 2009).  They argued that Islam’s message at its core is about egalitarianism 
and equality.  They traced the roots of their movement back to the prophet Muhammad who (along with his 
family) lived a life of poverty.  Whenever he was given any gifts, he would promptly distribute them amongst 
the poor.  His most prominent companions and successors, Abu-Bakr and Umar, instituted state support for 
the poor, guaranteeing a minimum living standard for all.  When this started to change during the tenure 
of the third successor, Uthman, another companion of the prophet, Ab-Dhar al-Ghifari, protested against 
the accumulation of wealth by Uthman and his family (Esposito 1995).  Islamic socialists argued that West 
believes in capitalism and inequality among people while egalitarianism and social welfare are Muslim values. 
Islamic socialism became the dominant narrative in many Muslim countries in the 1970s including Libya, 
Pakistan, Syria, Iraq, and Egypt.
While more work is needed to identify critical features of Islamic Socialism and other social movements that 
have defeated Islamism, one can see several reasons why it had some success.  The socialists realized that 
in order for their ideology to succeed, they had to adopt the arcing narrative pattern used by the dominant 
Islamic narrative.  They also had to get Muslims to believe that Islamic socialism went all the back to the start 
of their religion and was responsible for their glorious past (Paracha 2013).  During the cold war, the West 
fought against the socialist narratives around the world.  In Islamic countries this often meant supporting 
Islamists (e.g., the West supported the Islamists militarily in their civil war against the communists in 
Afghanistan).  Unfortunately, Western anti-socialism efforts succeeded a little too well in the Islamic world 
because in wiping out the Islamic socialist narrative, they left the Islamic narrative as the dominant thought 
in much of the Muslim world.
The first step of a Research and Design effort to develop an alternative course of action must be to study 
the historical social movements that offered alternatives to the Islamist narrative and had some success 
in replacing it.  We need to understand how these efforts were able to succeed and what needs to be done 
to replicate that success today.  The second step of such an effort is to look at comprehensive alternative 
narratives that are being proposed currently by Islamic social identity entrepreneurs (Upal 2015) to identify 
the narratives that have the best chance of gaining widespread following and eliminating the threat of 
terrorism against the West.  There are several such narratives in existence including those proposed by 
Muslim scientists such as the first Muslim scientist to win a Nobel Prize Dr. Abdus Salam. (Salam 1989)  
Muslim scientists argue that while Qur’an does emphasize worship, it also repeatedly exhorts its readers to 
think (e.g., Can’t you see how the earth is laid flat?  Can’t you see how the moon and sun obey their orbits so 
perfectly?).  In fact thinking and reflecting is one of the most frequently-mentioned commands in the Qur’an. 
Similarly, a much more plausible reason for the decline of the Islamic civilization is the decline of free 
thought, and its accompanying scientific and technological output.  A successful counter-narrative should 
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make it clear that if Muslims want to regain the glory of their early years, then they must educate themselves 
in modern science and technology.  The benefit of this alternative narrative is that it also facilitates an active 
role for the West.  For instance, Western governments can acknowledge the huge role that Islam played in the 
renaissance of science in Europe.  This will, in turn, allow the Muslims to claim free-thinking and science as 
inherent strengths of the Islamic civilization.
Once we develop a scientifically-informed comprehensive alternative narrative, we must work with our 
Western allies as well as governments and community leaders in Muslim countries to propagate it as widely 
as possible.  Just like the efforts to fight communism took decades, the fight against the international Jihadist 
movement will also take decades.  However, selecting the most effective counter-narrative will ensure that the 
Jihadist narrative is slowly eroded over time.
Conclusion
If we are serious about fighting the international Jihadi movement, we have to counter the ideologies and 
narratives that support this movement.  Without countering the underlying ideological basis of Jihadism, our 
counter-terrorism and counter-radicalization efforts will continue to fail.  We must develop a research and 
fact-based approach to develop a comprehensive alternative narrative thereby countering this growing threat 
to our security.
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